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Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts aenI11801-1806). By H.S. Harris. 
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The history of Hegel's philosophical maturation has itself been a 
matter of tumult and sharp polemic since Rosenkranz laid down his 
pen. Less than two decades after Kimmerle's revision of the 
chronology of the Jena writings, working with either scant or refractory 
materials, Henry Harris has managed to fashion an account of these 
vital years in Hegel's development that is both historically convincing 
and philosophically articulate. He has, as he intended, here lashed 
together the crossbeams of history and philosophical consciousness 
and proved himself capable of the next and final act, a full critical 
interpretation of the Phenomenology. 
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I shall abstract from the lively detail of Harris' exposition in 
order to present, in bare outline, his argument for a three-phased 
transformation of Hegel's vision of the system in the years 1801-1806 
and for a novel view of how the published works of 1807 and beyond 
embody "the philosophical system." Harris' contentions a.re important, 
deserving of wide debate, and readers' acceptance or rejection of them 
may well result in Hegel being accounted "the philosopher of 
individuality" in future histories, rather than "the philosopher of the 
absolute." But first let me note some features of Harris' interpretive 
method. Since much of the Jena material is fragmentary, tortuously 
detailed, and voiced in the foreign tongue of Schelling's conceptual 
vocabulary, Harris often carries forward texts or even phrases of the 
Differenzschrift to decipher if not the letter, then at least the direction 
of later texts. Since that document remarkably anticipates later 
directions in Hegel's thinking, and since as its translator Harris 
presumably understands its every nuance or suggestion, this 
technique is fruitful. Harris' hermeneutical standard is philosophical 
coherence, and he generally eschews staking an interpretation on the 
dating of a text or fragment. For the same reasons mentioned above, 
Harris chooses to build his general characterization of the three Jena 
epochs on catch-phrases culled from Rosenkranz's account of the 
lectures of the period or from Hegel's letters, labelling the system of 
1801 "the intuition of God's eternal human incarnation," the system of 
1803 "through philosophy to learn to live," and the system of 1805 "to 
teach philosophy to speak German." Harris' method, like many of his 
metaphors, it seems, is musical: If the critic can establish a 
philosophical theme that the reader can recognize as Hegelian, then 
perhaps some sense can be made of the whole score, the fragmentary, 
compressed, and tortured texts of the Jena years. 
 
From the System Program of 1796 through 1803, Harris finds 
the young Hegel basically under the influence of Schiller's ideal of an 
aesthetic harmonization of all human drives. What changes when 
Hegel joins Schelling in Jena in 1801 is not the centrality of Fichte's 
question, "How must the world be constituted if! am to be a moral 
being?" to defining the task and direction of philosophy, but the 
standpoint for answering that question. Fichte's stance of subjectivity, 
and with it the subordination of the theoretical to the practical, is 
replaced by the self-sufficient standpoint of the speculative, or 
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intellectual in tuition. By the latter term both identity philosophers 
mean a cognitive or theoretical stance which 1) abstracts from 
everything individual or idiosyncratic in the thinker, 2) abstracts from 
the "preponderance of consciousness" or from subjectivity as such, 
and thus attains to 3) insight into the reciprocal overlap (as Schelling 
described it, the Ineinsbildung) of nature and spirit. Hegel first 
conceives the task of logic (or "critical logic" as he called it) as a 
negative vehicle for achieving the impartiality of intellectual intuition; 
its destruction of the finitude (or bad infinity) of empirical science 
paves the way for a speculative or "poetic" philosophy of nature, which 
Hegel models more on Plato's Timaeus than on Newton's Principia. The 
polemical essays of the Critical Journal display this destructive attitude 
as well, here aimed at the popular contenders (or pretenders) in the 
field of philosophy. 
 
The central idea of Hegel's four-part system of 1801, as Harris 
reconstructs it, is to view both nature and spirit as equally and alike 
"the intuition of God's eternal human incarnation." This system's logic 
is twofold; a preparatory criticism of finite modes of cognition 
motivates the ascent to the infinite, while a purely speculative logic 
considers the idea as syllogism, the identity of the laws of identity and 
contradiction, and the ascent of thought to the unconditioned in the 
ontological argument. In the philosophy of nature "the idea comes 
down to earth," and is first viewed in the movements of the aether, 
that is, in the neo-Pythagorean celestial mechanics of Kepler. Hegel's 
treatment assimilates mere motion to "life" and views animate life as 
the highest expression of nature. Thirdly, in the philosophy of spirit, 
the idea is seen to be embodied in the free ethical community of a 
people which shapes its political agreement from the strictures it 
places on family and tribal ties and the annihilation of individuality it 
demands in sacrifice and war. The death as liberation theme manifests 
Hegel's peculiarly Christian interests, which are displayed fully in a 
fourth and concluding division entitled, "Resumption into a Whole." 
This resumption is the philosophy of religion, viewed as the evolution 
of religious consciousness from Greek religion to Catholicism, to the 
Protestant religion of freedom. Much of the resumption was evidently 
given over to a rational exposition of trinitarian theology. The texts 
that survive from this period are few, the Dissertation on the Orbits of 
the Planets of 1801 and the System of Ethical Life of 1802. Harris 
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himself attempts to reconstruct the trinitarian elaboration of system or 
"Triangle of Triangles" that Rosenkranz reports. Not only is Prof. 
Harris' reconstruction ingenious, but it virtually demonstrates the 
systematic, interconnected character of Hegel's thought at this early 
date. Harris is only tentative on the date of the "Holy Triangle" 
scheme, citing affinities with the Difference essay and the Dissertation, 
but a cryptic passage from Schelling's Bruno (published in April 1802) 
confirms his conjecture: "You could comprehend the law according to 
which distances increase among the stars that possess life most 
perfectly if you give some further thought to what we have already 
discussed. But you would understand it more readily if you were aware 
of the mysteries of the triangle" (Werke, 4 [Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856], 
pp. 273-274). Schelling's comment is unintelligible in its own context. 
 
With Schelling's departure from Jena in 1803 Hegel was left on 
his own and free to move in his own direction. According to Harris, he 
turned sharply away from the impersonality of identity philosophy, 
thematized the problem of the individuality of the thinker, and 
resurrected the idea of the philosopher's social mission. "The true need 
of philosophy," announces Hegel in a lecture, "arises from nothing else 
but this, to learn from it and through it how to live." Harris represents 
this dramatic shift in focus variously: 1) What had been the critical 
objection to Fichte in 1801, "the preponderance of consciousness," 
now becomes the essential thing. 2) No longer are Schiller's aesthetic 
harmonization of human drives or Kant's moral ideal of a rational 
community Hegel's guiding ideas; in their place meditations on the 
need for philosophy are brought forward from the 1801 Difference 
essay. 3) The dynamism of the eternal incarnation of God as 
evidenced in the history of religious consciousness turns the thinker to 
the explicit task of overcoming Greek flxity of thought. Or 4), the 
tranquil Spinozistic parallelism of identity philosophy bursts asunder 
and calls the philosopher's individuality and subjectivity into question. 
(A similar problem besets Schelling's identity philosophy after 1802, 
but it is unhappily solved by recourse to a mythical account of 
individuality as a "fall" from the idea.) 
 
Hegel's 1803 system is tripartite in structure; the "resumption" 
in the history of religious consciousness falls away, as does the 
centrality of religion in the life of spirit as such. In its flrst part, logic or 
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metaphysics, this system abandons the earlier idea of a destructive 
purging of the categories of flnitude and attends instead to the 
formation of individual consciousness. This metaphysics situates 
individuals in their world in three stages, advancing from  
considerations of the need for philosophy to a review of the flnite and 
defective forms of cognition, and from there to a consideration of the 
structure of consciousness as such. The 1803 philosophy of nature, in 
Harris' view, radically alters the 1801 vision of nature a~ the eternal 
incarnation of God, and declares instead that nature is the other-being 
of spirit or the death of God. So must nature be viewed by a 
philosophy which takes as its sole task the recognition of deity inside 
human cognition. Harris' lengthy treatment of all the natural 
phenomena compassed in the 1803-04 Naturphilosophie is lucid and 
detailed, and can be taken as emblematic of all of Hegel's early 
attempts in this area. Transiting to a treatment of the 1803-04 
philosophy of spirit, Harris argues emphatically that Hegel is a 
materialist, not a theist, that human self-consciousness is existing self-
cognizing spirit which is existent and self-cognizing there alone, and 
that, in general, Hegel's consistently maintained philosophic goal was 
to put the affective force of religious consciousness behind the 
scientiflc view of human life. The culmination of the 1803 system is a 
sustained meditation on the human community as the locus of 
meaning and meaningfulness, and on the crucial ways that language, 
education, and social recognition serve as conditions for the coming to 
be of persons. What Hegel here achieves, contends Harris, is an 
impersonal doctrine of the absolute value of rational personality. 
 
In 1805-06 Hegel's vision of system undergoes yet another 
transformation, brought on by what Harris calls a "phenomenological 
crisis." The 1803 system had turned its attention to the individual 
abstractly considered, but now Hegel, impelled by his enduring 
conviction of the social mission of philosophy, focuses on the problem 
of concrete or existing individuals and their education into the 
philosophic stance. Hegel announced in his initial lecture for the winter 
semester of 1804-05 that philosophy was not esoteric (as in 
Schelling's formalism or Boehme's mysticism) but popular, "popular" in 
the sense that it digs down into the stuff of ordinary experience to 
reveal the presence of the divine, but also in the sense that it works 
within the medium of ordinary language. Hegel writes that his goal is 
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"to try to teach philosophy to speak German," and we cannot think this 
goal is accidental or extrinsic, for, as he put it in Faith and Knowledge, 
"the concept is itself the mediator between itself and life· " 
 
This new "populist" vision of philosophy's goal puts Hegel's 
hitherto formulated ideas of the systematic function of logic under 
stress. In 1805-06 he divided his lectures into logic or speculative 
metaphysics and real philosophy; he seems simply to ignore the idea 
of a preliminary or critical logic and to want to open the system with a 
fully articulate and self-justifying science of metaphysics. With this 
move, however, the problem of a beginning asserts itself, and it is all 
the more acute since philosophy is now supposed to speak in the 
tongue of ordinary experience. In the systematic space vacated by 
critical logic, Harris contends, the Phenomenology will come to be as a 
science that is at once speculative and introductory. What in 1801 was 
seen as the necessary propaedeutic to philosophy, the sacrifice of 
subjectivity in critical logic, will become in 1807 the phenomenological 
sacrifice of self as such, a cognitive surrender to the absolute in both 
cases. Thus over the course of the Jena years, argues Harris, what 
Hegel generally accomplishes is the transformation of the whole of 
identity philosophy (the critical theory, or idealistic reconstruction, of 
experience) into a preamble to the Idea. 
 
Ample texts remain for the 1805-06 philosophies of nature and 
of spirit, and Harris provides a detailed, sometimes philosophically 
empassioned, exposition of each. The Naturphilosophie casts off the 
materialistic guise of its 1803 exposition and reverts to the theological 
physics of 1801, which begins with the primal motions of the aether 
and proceeds all the way up to the organic processes, now viewed as 
the natural correlate of the people's communal life. The philosophy of 
spirit announces that the reality of the cognitive aspect of the total 
natural process is spirit. It stresses the interdependence of the 
community and the individual: Ethical substance is human nature and 
is the producer of human individuals, but its ultimate cause is the 
freedom of individuals. Initially, ethical substance necessitates and 
coerces human behavior, which later, after education and experience, 
comes into its legacy of freedom and finds its fulfillment in the realms 
of political association, art, and religion. To these considerations Harris 
appends an interpretation of a system-diagram which appears in the 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Owl of Minerva, Vol 17, No. 1 (Fall 1985): pg. 59-63. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
7 
 
margins of Hegel's discussion of organic process. It traces the cyclical 
course of the human individual's life and experience within the 
permanent frameworks of nature and society and shows how the 
individual comes into spiritual possession of the whole. These few 
pages could stand as a "resumption" of Hegel's whole philosophy and 
are a remarkable philosophical achievement on Harris' part. 
 
Harris concludes this massive study with a free-form preview of 
his interpretation of the Phenomenology, suggesting a reading of 
Hegel's mature system that promises to end the seemingly endless 
Phenomenology versus Encyclopedia debate. The system is 
quadripartite, argues Harris, with the Phenomenology serving as a 
prelude to the logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit in 
the theoretical perspective, while in the practical (or educational) 
perspective, it serves as a prelude to the triad of speculative 
philosophy, real philosophy, and absolute knowledge. The very goal of 
the system as a whole is the retrieval of the Phenomenology in the 
philosophy of spirit, for, contends Harris, the essence of the 
Phenomenology, both as systematic introduction and as science, is 
that it be the cross of logic and history on which individuality dies and 
is resurrected as cognition. It thus fulfills the ideal formulated in 1803, 
learning from philosophy how to live -or rather, not exactly how to 
live, but what life is all about. And this learning involves the 
vindication of our claim as persons to freedom within the order of 
nature. "We must understand," writes Harris, "how historical freedom 
is naturally possible (what its nature is), given that the order of nature 
is logically necessary for the realization of freedom in history." This 
understanding is precisely the reconciliation of nature and spirit which 
was the aspiration of identity philosophy since 1801, and it alone is the 
meaning of Hegel's incessant God-talk. " ... Hegel turned the 
speculative tradition of Christian panentheism into a properly critical 
philosophy-i.e., one in which 'God' has no transcendent status 
whatsoever, being only the Gestalt in which the transcendental 
structure of experience appears as a whole." 
 
Adjectives simply fail the writer faced with the task of evaluating 
Harris' study. The book involved ten years of labor, translation of most 
of the major texts included. Harris brings to bear a vast amount of 
erudition and research on the technical tasks of dating a fragment or 
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interpreting Rosenkranz's lecture reports. Night Thoughts furnishes us 
for the first time with a coherent account of how Hegel came into 
possession of his philosophy, and helps us see how the would-be 
Volkserzieher of Bern and Frankfurt came to be a systematic 
philosopher without a major change in ideals or goals. Professor Harris' 
account of Hegel's philosophical debts, honest and non polemical as it 
is - for instance, in its refusal to exaggerate the differences between 
Schelling and Hegel in their years at Jena -lets what is bold and unique 
in Hegel's philosophy come to the fore, namely, that "the idea comes 
down to earth," teaches human individuals about the natural and 
social constraints upon their rationality, and leads them to a richer and 
fuller appropriation of their historically and socially achieved 
rationality. That one book can do all this, and still be graced by wit, 
charm, and style-admittedly in an idiosyncratic style, one unafraid to 
announce its conclusions under the rubric "Recessional Voluntary," 
since Hegel had in 1801 called the labor of philosophy "divine service" 
- is quite amazing. No one seriously interested in Hegel should fail to 
read it. 
